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ABSTRACT
In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Supreme Court recognized
intimate association as one of the two distinct senses of the freedom of
association. In doing so, the Court identified two essential functions
that justify constitutional protection for the relationships that provide
them: intimate relationships cultivate and transmit shared ideals and
beliefs, and they provide opportunities for emotional enrichment and
self-identification by facilitating the creation of close bonds among
members. Then, recognizing that familial relationships often
exemplify these functions, the Court identified four aspects of family
relationships that would help distinguish intimate from nonintimate
associations: size, purpose, selectivity, and seclusion from others.
Despite the secondary role of these aspects, subsequent decisions have
focused solely on these four characteristics without even mentioning
the justifications that originally supported constitutional protection.
This factor-based analysis has resulted in unpredictable and
inconsistent decisions that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the
entire Roberts framework. Drawing from the original functional
justifications, this Note argues that courts must abandon their sole
reliance on the Roberts factors and instead adopt a functional
analysis that properly appreciates the right’s underlying values and
ensures that groups reflecting those values are consistently protected.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2004, a group of students at the College of Staten Island
1
(CSI) applied to have the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi
2
Fraternity officially recognized by CSI. Because the fraternity
allowed only male students to join, the college determined that it
3
violated CSI’s antidiscrimination policy and withheld recognition. As
a result, the fraternity could not use CSI’s facilities, calendars, and
bulletin boards; receive funding from CSI; associate the college’s
name with the group’s name; or distribute information on campus to
4
recruit new members. The fraternity sued for a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy,
alleging that CSI had violated its rights of intimate and expressive
5
association. In Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City
6
University of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York concluded that “[u]nder the totality of
circumstances, considering the Fraternity’s relatively small size,
exclusivity in membership, and seclusion in activities central to the
group’s purposes, [the] plaintiffs ha[d] shown ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’
likelihood of success on the merits that the Fraternity qualifie[d] as an
7
8
intimate association.” The court therefore granted the injunction.
After hearing the case on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that “[b]ased on its size, level of selectivity, purpose, and
inclusion of non-members, the Fraternity lack[ed] the characteristics
9
that typify groups with strong claims to intimate association.” Even
though both courts considered the same factors in reaching their
opposite conclusions, neither court explained why those factors were
determinative or how they were relevant to analyzing the group’s
level of intimacy. Nevertheless, as the courts struggled to define the

1. The College of Staten Island is a senior college within the City University of New York.
Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 380.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 381.
6. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d
374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
7. Id. at 387.
8. Id. at 397.
9. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 147
(2d Cir. 2007).
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attributes of a constitutionally protected intimate association, the Chi
Iota Colony—having been denied access to the resources enjoyed by
other student groups—disbanded while its case was before the
10
Second Circuit.
More than fifty years before the Chi Iota Colony’s case reached
the Second Circuit, Justice Goldberg opined that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes limits on a state’s ability to regulate truly
private relationships. He explained, “[I]t is the constitutional right of
every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his
social intimates . . . . These and other rights pertaining to privacy and
private association are themselves constitutionally protected
11
liberties.” Twenty years after Justice Goldberg wrote these words, in
12
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Supreme Court recognized the right of
intimate association as one of the “two distinct senses” of the
13
freedom of association. The Roberts Court identified two functions
that are characteristic of the kinds of intimate associations that are
entitled to constitutional protection: First, these associations
“cultivat[e] and transmit[] shared ideals and beliefs.” Second, they
provide opportunities for emotional enrichment and self14
identification by facilitating the creation of close bonds. Because
familial relationships exemplify these roles, the Court concluded that
the distinguishing aspects of family relationships—their size, purpose,
selectivity, and seclusion from others—would help identify similar
groups that “are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an
understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of
15
personal liberty.”
Although these factors were intended to serve as proxies for the
underlying values of intimate association, courts considering intimate
association claims by nonfamily groups after Roberts—including the
Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony—have increasingly analyzed a
group’s intimacy solely based on some combination of the group’s

10. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 149, 191 (2010).
11. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
12. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
13. Id. at 617. The other half of the freedom of association—expressive association—is
anchored in the First Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite its status as
one part of the freedom of association, expressive association is largely beyond the scope of this
Note because these two types of associative freedom are usually analyzed separately.
14. Id. at 618–19.
15. Id. at 620.
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size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusion of nonmembers—the Roberts
16
factors. Disconnected from the values that they were intended to
help identify, these factors provide no basis for meaningful
comparison. As a result, a group’s level of constitutional protection
often depends on a court’s unpredictable and arbitrary analysis of the
group’s objective characteristics in light of the court’s own conception
17
of what constitutes intimacy.
Regardless of whether the fraternity in Chi Iota Colony was truly
18
an intimate association entitled to constitutional protection, the
factor-based analysis employed in these cases denies groups the
ability to make a direct case for protection and creates uncertainty for
similarly situated groups across the country. This Note argues that to
develop a consistent and workable framework for intimate
association analysis, courts should abandon their myopic reliance on
the Roberts factors and adopt a functional analysis that determines a
group’s intimacy based on whether the group performs the two
functions that Roberts identified as defining intimate associations:
(1) “cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs” and
19
(2) facilitating the creation of close ties between members.
The functional analysis proposed by this Note differs from
traditional responses to intimate association decisions. These
responses typically fall into one of two categories: either they accept
the factor-based analysis as a given and object to a court’s particular

16. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)
(“In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant
constitutional protection, we consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether
others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.”); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In determining the nature of a given
relationship, relevant factors to consider include a group’s ‘size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent.’” (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620)); La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483,
1494 (5th Cir. 1995) (“In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently private to
warrant constitutional protection, as well as the scope of that protection, the Court has
considered several factors, including: (1) the organization’s size; (2) its purposes; (3) the
selectivity in choosing its members; (4) the congeniality among its members; (5) whether others
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship; and, (6) other characteristics that in a
particular case may be pertinent.”).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. Because both the district court and the court of appeals organized their analyses
around the Roberts factors, the decisions provided little insight into the actual role that the
group played in the life of its members and did very little to answer the key question of whether
the group provided the benefits that should have entitled it to constitutional protection.
19. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19.
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20

application of the factors, or they advocate an abandonment of the
Roberts intimate and expressive association framework altogether in
21
favor of a broader right of assembly. Taking a middle ground, this
Note proposes that the Roberts framework can be salvaged, but only
if courts shift their analysis of intimate association claims from one
that is based on the formulaic application of the Roberts factors to
one that requires a substantive consideration of the group’s functions.
Parts I.A and I.B review the early foundations of the right of
intimate association and its initial recognition in Roberts, noting both
the functional and factor-based characteristics of intimate associations
identified by the Supreme Court. Part I.C examines the entrenchment
of factor-based analysis after Roberts as courts have applied the right
of intimate association to nonfamily social groups. Part II
demonstrates two inherent shortcomings of any approach that
attempts to work within the current factor-based doctrine. First, Part
II.A examines intimate association precedent to demonstrate the
unpredictability and inconsistency that is inherent in each of the
Roberts factors. Second, Part II.B illustrates the potential for a group
to manipulate the Roberts factors to improve its level of constitutional
protection without making any substantive changes to the role that
the group plays in the lives of its members. Finally, Part III proposes
a functional intimate association analysis that will overcome the
problems posed by factor-based analysis and will protect groups that
more closely reflect the values underlying the right of intimate
association.
I. RECOGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RIGHT OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
A. Doctrinal Foundations of the Right of Intimate Association
The freedom of association was first recognized by the Supreme
22
Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. In Patterson, the
NAACP challenged the constitutionality of an order by an Alabama
20. See, e.g., Clinton N. Daggan, Case Comment, Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi
Fraternity v. City University of New York, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 627, 628 (2008/09) (“This
case comment contends that the Second Circuit’s analysis was too stringent and is inconsistent
with the United States Supreme Court’s and other federal circuit courts’ ‘spectrum’ analysis.”).
21. See Inazu, supra note 10, at 153–55 (proposing that the categories of intimate and
expressive association should be eliminated and that courts should begin to apply the right of
assembly as a means of strengthening group autonomy).
22. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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state court requiring it to disclose the names of its members. Finding
that the order constituted an unconstitutional interference with the
24
group’s associational rights, the Supreme Court held that the
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
25
freedom of speech.” Because it relied on both the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and the First Amendment’s
protection of free speech, however, the decision did not precisely
26
define the constitutional source of the freedom of association.
27
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court established the
foundation of the right of intimate association by identifying the right
of privacy as falling within the “penumbras” formed by the various
28
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In doing so, the Court
extended the “zone of privacy” to include not only the privacy of
membership lists that had allowed the NAACP’s members in
Patterson to associate without interference, but also the privacy to
29
enter into and maintain private personal relationships. The Griswold
Court concluded by identifying the two ends of the spectrum of
relationships that would qualify for protection—with marriage on one
30
end and groups like the NAACP on the other. The Court held that
marriage, unlike the association protected in Patterson, “is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
23. Id. at 454.
24. Id. at 462–63.
25. Id. at 460 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
26. See John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77
TENN. L. REV. 485, 517 (2010) (“It was clear that the Court had broken new constitutional
ground in NAACP v. Alabama, but specifying exactly what had taken place proved elusive.”);
id. at 558 (noting Justice Douglas’s preference for basing the right of association in the First
Amendment—the “incorporation argument”—and Justice Brennan’s preference for basing the
right in the Fourteenth Amendment—the “liberty argument”).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Id. at 484.
29. See id. at 485–86 (noting that the right of privacy within marriage is protected by the
right of association).
30. Id. at 483 (“In like context, we have protected forms of ‘association’ that are not
political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the
members.” (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1963))). This Note argues that,
rather than simply staking out two types of protected associations, those similar to the NAACP
and those related to marriage, the Court actually suggested a spectrum between the privacy
necessary to protect expressive associations such as the NAACP and the privacy inherent in
marital relationships. This spectrum includes a wide variety of associations, including fraternal
relationships.
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living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
31
involved in our prior decisions.”
Professor Kenneth Karst argues that Griswold and its progeny
can all “be seen as variations on a single theme: the freedom of
32
intimate association.” Karst defines an intimate association as “a
close and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some
33
significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship.” In
his view, these relationships are primarily distinguished by some
mixture of “living in the same quarters, or sexual intimacy, or blood
34
ties, or a formal relationship.” Explaining why such associations
should be protected, Karst identifies four benefits provided by
intimate associations: (1) “the opportunity to enjoy the society of”
35
others, (2) the opportunity “to love and be loved” in committed
36
relationships, (3) the emotional enrichment from “close and
37
enduring association,” and (4) the formative effect that close
38
relationships have on an individual’s self-identification. Although
the Supreme Court did not cite Karst’s article when it recognized the
right of intimate association in Roberts, many of Professor Karst’s
values were reflected in the Court’s rationales for protecting intimate
39
associations.
B. Supreme Court Recognition of Intimate Association Rights
In Roberts, the Court separated the two recognized sources of
constitutional support for the right of association—the First and
Fourteenth Amendments—and concluded for the first time that the

31. Id. at 486.
32. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980).
33. Id. at 629.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 630–31.
36. Id. at 632–33.
37. Id. at 633–35.
38. Id. at 635–37.
39. For example, the Court explained the rationale for recognizing the right of intimate
association by reasoning: “[T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the
realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with
others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards
the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); see also Inazu, supra note 10, at 165 & n.83
(“Brennan’s Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the intellectual debt is apparent.”).
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freedom of association encompasses two distinct rights. The first,
intimate association—anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment—
protects the ability to “enter into and maintain certain intimate
41
human relationships.”
The second, expressive association—
anchored in the First Amendment—protects the “right to associate
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
42
Amendment.”
The right of intimate association, as envisioned by the Roberts
43
Court, promotes individual liberty
by protecting human
relationships that facilitate cultural and personal development from
44
undue interference by the state. To distinguish intimate from
nonintimate associations, the Court in Roberts described both the
45
functions and the characteristics of intimate associations. Despite the
tendency of courts in later cases to focus on only a few of these
46
characteristics, this Note argues that the controlling consideration
should be whether the group performs the defining functions of
intimate associations and, as a result, provides the benefits to its
members that justify constitutional protection for those associations.
1. Defining Functions of Intimate Associations. Although it left
the door open for other considerations, the Court specifically noted
two characteristic functions of intimate associations: (1) “cultivating
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs” and (2) providing the
opportunity to experience the “emotional enrichment” that
47
individuals gain from “close ties with others.” These functions
provide the basis for the analysis proposed in Part III.
The decisions cited by the Roberts Court in support of the first
function demonstrate the importance of intimate associations, wholly
apart from their potential expressive value, in limiting the state’s
ability to define or control social and cultural norms through
40. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617 (“Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 618.
43. See id. at 617–18 (“[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme.”).
44. Id. at 617–19.
45. Id. at 618–20.
46. See infra Part I.C.
47. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19.
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otherwise-legitimate actions. In this sense, intimate associations
“foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and
48
the power of the State.” The Court has, therefore, overruled state
49
preempt decisions about
actions that prohibit marriage,
50
51
procreation, limit a family’s ability to cohabitate, interfere with
52
parental control over the education of children, or significantly
53
disrupt or threaten political organizations. These examples
demonstrate the importance of an individual’s ability to develop,
share, and act upon his beliefs in an attempt to preserve a unique, and
54
even unpopular, way of life. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, the
Court explained, “The freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we
share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It tends to produce the
diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic

48. Id. at 619.
49. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“It is not surprising that the decision
to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. . . . Surely, a decision to marry and raise the
child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee’s right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which
the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.”).
50. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, then,
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.”).
51. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(“Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.”).
52. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in universal
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children . . . .”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”).
53. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“Of course, it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”).
54. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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55

government . . . .” Thus, the protection of a group’s ability to share
its beliefs internally, regardless of any external message, benefits both
its members and the nation as a whole. Accordingly, when analyzing
an intimate association claim, a court should consider the potential
for a group to cultivate and transmit shared ideals and beliefs.
In contrast to the first function’s societal benefits, the second
function—the facilitation of close relationships among members of
the group—emphasizes the individual benefits of intimate
associations. As the Roberts Court explained, “Protecting these
relationships . . . safeguards the ability independently to define one’s
56
identity.” Recognizing an additional benefit of close relationships,
Professor Karst argues that “[f]or most of us, the chief value in
intimate association is the opportunity” to “love and be loved” and to
57
care and be cared for through committed relationships. Although
family relationships may often provide opportunities for personal
58
development, entitling family relationships to special recognition,
59
these opportunities are not restricted to the family alone. In fact, the
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment allows individuals to
satisfy their “intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [their]
60
own home[s]” in a variety of ways. It is hard to imagine that private
social groups might not also provide opportunities similarly worthy of
constitutional protection.
By recognizing the benefits of intimate associations rather than
simply defining specific protected relationships, the Roberts Court
laid the foundation for the decision in Board of Directors of Rotary
55. Id. at 575.
56. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
57. Karst, supra note 32, at 632.
58. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment))); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause . . . .”).
59. Nor are biological families always entitled to protection. See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at
255 (rejecting a biological father’s due process challenge to the adoption of his illegitimate child
by another man because the biological father had never sought actual or legal custody of the
child).
60. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia statute
that prohibited the possession of obscene materials within the home).
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International v. Rotary Club of Duarte. In that case, the Court held
that although marriage, as “the foundation of the family and of
62
63
society,” is a prototypical example of intimate association, the
protection afforded by the right is not “restricted to relationships
64
among family members.” Indeed, the Court had previously
explained the wide variety of protected nonexpressive associations in
Gilmore, holding:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white,
all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also
permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established.
Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates
65
must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.

2. External Characteristics of Intimate Associations. After
explaining the functions and benefits that underlie the protection of
intimate associations, the Roberts Court went on to describe the
characteristics of relationships that “are likely to reflect the
considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of
66
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.” This
statement suggests that these characteristics were only intended to
serve a secondary role, helping courts identify groups that are likely
to produce the two benefits on which the Court based its decision in
Roberts.
Building on well-established precedent recognizing the
importance of family relationships, the Roberts Court explained that
intimate associations, like families, “involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
67
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”
61. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
62. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
211 (1888)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
63. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (“The personal affiliations that
exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the
relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend
the creation and sustenance of a family . . . .”).
64. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545.
65. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (quoting Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
66. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
67. Id. at 619–20.
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Recognizing the need for flexibility in identifying associations that
deserve protection, the Court explained that a “broad range of
human relationships . . . may make greater or lesser claims to
68
constitutional protection.” The Court marked the ends of this
spectrum by noting that family relationships exemplify intimate
association and are entitled to the strongest constitutional protection,
whereas “large business enterprise[s]” are “remote” from the
underlying values of intimate association and are not entitled to
69
protection. To further aid lower courts in the difficult task of
70
assessing a relationship’s constitutional value, the Court identified
five factors—the Roberts factors—that have become the framework
for current intimate association analysis. These factors “include size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics
71
that in a particular case may be pertinent.”
The Roberts Court then applied these factors to determine
whether the Jaycees, a nonprofit organization open only to young
men, qualified as an intimate association. The Court began its analysis
by noting that the local chapters at issue in the case had 400 and 430
72
members respectively. In a discussion of the group’s purpose, the
Court cited the Jaycees’ bylaws, finding that the Jaycees’ mission was
to develop a “spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest,” to
provide members with an opportunity for personal development, and
to “develop true friendship and understanding among young men of
73
all nations.” Then, analyzing the selectivity of the group, the Court
found that the Jaycees were “basically unselective,” noting in
particular that age and sex were the only criteria for membership and
that new members were regularly “admitted with no inquiry into their
74
backgrounds.” Finally, the Court found that the Jaycees did not
maintain policies that excluded nonmembers from critical aspects of
the relationship because nonmembers of both genders were regularly

68. Id. at 620.
69. Id.
70. See id. (“Determining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to enter
into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that
relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments.”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 621.
73. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 2, Roberts 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724), 1984
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237, at *5) (internal quotation mark omitted).
74. Id. at 621.
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invited to participate in a substantial portion of “activities central to
75
the decision of many members to associate with one another.” Based
on these considerations, the Court held that the Jaycees “lack[ed] the
distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection
76
to the decision of its members to exclude women.”
C. Entrenchment of Factor-Based Intimate Association Analysis
Three years later, the Court considered whether California’s
77
Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination “in all
78
business establishments,” violated the Rotary Club’s right of
79
intimate association. In holding that the Rotary Club was not an
intimate association, the Court relied exclusively on the factors it had
identified in Roberts. Beginning with an analysis of the group’s size,
the Court found that local chapters ranged from twenty to more than
nine hundred members and that those members were instructed to
keep a flow of new members coming in, both to enlarge membership
80
and to make up for a turnover rate of about 10 percent each year.
Next, the Court noted that the purpose of the Rotary Club was to
“produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership” that created a
“cross section of the business and professional life of the
81
community,” and that Rotary Clubs were encouraged to include all
“qualified prospective members located within [their] territory,”
82
avoiding “arbitrary limits” on membership. Finally, the Court found
that “[m]any of the Rotary Clubs’ central activities [were] carried on
in the presence of strangers,” and that Rotary Clubs “[sought] to keep
83
their ‘windows and doors open to the whole world.’”
Although these early intimate association cases were consistent
with each other and likely reached the same conclusions as would
have resulted from functional analyses, they have nevertheless had a
limiting effect on the development of the right of intimate association.
The Court’s denial of constitutional protection to two nonfamily
groups within three years of recognizing the right of intimate
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
Id.
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987).
Id. at 546.
Id. (quoting 1 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, FOCUS ON ROTARY 60–61 (1981)).
Id. at 547.
Id. (quoting 1 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, supra note 81, at 60–61).
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association likely signaled a stricter standard for intimate association
claims than otherwise would have been required by the right’s
underlying rationale. Roberts and Duartes also provided a framework
for dismissing intimate association claims without a substantive
investigation into the nature of the relationships at issue. In City of
84
Dallas v. Stanglin, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that a city ordinance establishing age and hour restrictions on
85
“teenage” dance halls violated the patrons’ associational rights.
Dismissing the ordinance’s impact on intimate association in one
sentence, the Court concluded, “It is clear beyond cavil that dancehall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not
engaged in the sort of ‘intimate human relationships’ referred to in
86
Roberts.”
A reliance on an increasingly strict application of the factors
alone can be seen in subsequent circuit court opinions concerning
intimate association claims by social clubs. In Louisiana Debating &
87
Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether the application of a city ordinance that prohibited
discrimination in places of public accommodation violated the
88
intimate or private associational rights of four exclusive clubs.
Applying the Roberts factors, the court found that the clubs, which
had between 325 and 1000 members and lacked any affiliation with a
89
national organization, were “[r]elatively small in size.” The purpose
of the clubs was exclusively social, the court held, and all of the clubs
had very restrictive admissions processes, including rigorous
90
screening and votes by the general membership. The court also
favorably noted that the clubs had policies that strictly excluded
91
nonmembers from using club facilities. Based solely on these
84. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
85. Id. at 20–22.
86. Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984)). The case was
ultimately decided under the rubric of expressive association, and only Justices Stevens and
Blackmun would have considered the existence of a general right of “social association” under
the Fourteenth rather than the First Amendment. Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
87. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483 (5th Cir. 1995).
88. See id. at 1493 n.15 (explaining that the Supreme Court uses the broad term “private
association” to connote constitutional protections for organizations and relationships outside
the family).
89. Id. at 1497.
90. Id. at 1496.
91. Id.
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considerations, the court concluded that “the Clubs constitute
organizations whose location on the spectrum of personal
92
attachments places them near those that are ‘most intimate.’” They
were, therefore, entitled to “the fullest protection of their right of
93
private association.”
94
In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh, the
Third Circuit denied a fraternity’s claim that its associational rights
were violated when its university recognition was revoked because
four members had been arrested during a drug raid at the fraternity’s
95
house. In a brief application of the Roberts factors that considered
only the fraternity’s size, selectivity, and level of seclusion, the court
concluded that the fraternity was not entitled to constitutional
96
protection as an intimate association. Interestingly, the court made
no mention of the fraternity’s purpose, which had been one of the
primary considerations in Duarte and which is the factor that is
arguably the most relevant in determining the functions the group will
provide.
Most recently, in Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit rejected
the Chi Iota Colony’s intimate association claim by relying entirely on
97
the Roberts framework. The court began by considering the size of
the fraternity. Despite finding that the fraternity had only nineteen
members, the court focused on the fact that the fraternity hoped one
day to have as many as fifty pledges each semester and had no upper
limit on membership, and concluded that the group’s size was a
98
“product of circumstances, not a desire to maintain intimacy.” Next,
the court considered the fraternity’s purpose. The court characterized
the purposes of the fraternity as “broad, public-minded goals that
[did] not depend for their promotion on close-knit bonds,” such as
encouraging participation in university and community activities,
99
engaging in community service, and expressing Jewish culture.

92. Id. at 1497 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
93. La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497–98.
94. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 438–39.
96. Id. at 442 (“All of these elements—the Chapter’s size, lack of selectivity, and lack of
seclusion in its activities—support our conclusion that the Chapter lacks the essential
characteristics of constitutionally protected intimate association.”).
97. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136,
145–48 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. Id. at 145.
99. Id. at 146.
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Having determined that the fraternity’s goal was broad and publicminded, the court declined to assign any significance to the
fraternity’s stated goal “to foster personal, intimate relationships
between its members” because that goal was similar to that held by
100
“nearly any student group in which members become close friends.”
The court also considered the fraternity’s selectivity. Although
the court found that the fraternity “employ[ed] some care in selecting
recruits in order to ensure that all its members [were] compatible,”
the court ultimately emphasized the fact that the fraternity
aggressively recruited new members from the student body, both to
101
replace members who had graduated and to enlarge membership.
Further, the court held that because “a relatively high percentage of
Jewish men at CSI who express[ed] an interest in the Fraternity
[were] invited to join,” the selectivity of the group “compare[d]
unfavorably with that employed in creating the strongest of
102
associational interests, as in the cases of marriage or adoption.”
Finally, the court considered whether the fraternity sufficiently
excluded nonmembers from its activities. Rejecting the district court’s
conclusion that members-only weekly business meetings and secret
103
rituals were “central to the Fraternity’s purpose,” the court instead
determined that public recruitment events and parties for
104
nonmembers were the “crucial aspects of its existence.” Because
these events were open to the public, the court concluded that the
fraternity, like the Jaycees or the Rotary Club, was not sufficiently
105
exclusive. Based on this analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that
“the Fraternity lack[ed] the characteristics that typify groups with
106
strong claims to intimate association.”
Despite its general acceptance in the courts, this reliance on the
Roberts factors has not gone entirely unnoticed. Professor Kevin
Worthen purports to propose a functionalist approach to intimate
association claims that would protect inner-city public schools and

100. Id. This finding is particularly problematic given the fact that the primary aim of the
fraternity was to “foster and promote brotherly love.” Id.
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 145–46.
103. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d
374, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
104. Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 147.
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107

Native American tribes. Arguing that such an approach should
protect entities that provide either the societal benefit of transmitting
108
ideals and beliefs or the individual benefit of emotional enrichment,
Professor Worthen concludes that public schools could satisfy the first
109
prong and Native American tribes could satisfy the second.
Professor Worthen recognizes the importance of justifying the use of
the Roberts factors by identifying how they are relevant to the group’s
ability to serve the characteristic functions of intimate associations.
Nevertheless, he declines to consider the potential for courts to
entirely alter the group of factors that they would analyze—say, by
ignoring irrelevant Roberts factors and considering other factors that
might be useful in a particular case. This default consideration of only
the Roberts factors suggests their continued pervasiveness even
among critics of the factor-based analysis.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF A FACTOR-BASED INTIMATE
ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS
The applications of factor-based analysis described in the
previous Part reveal two inherent shortcomings. First, for a group
seeking protection, the courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable analysis
creates uncertainty about the strength and likely success of an
intimate association claim. Second, factor-based analysis is a poor
proxy for intimacy and is likely to be both underinclusive and
overinclusive. Thus, in addition to denying protection to groups that
may otherwise be considered intimate, factor-based analysis is
susceptible to manipulation by groups that are able to adjust their
physical attributes without any real increase in intimacy.
A. Unpredictable and Inconsistent Analysis of the Roberts Factors
1. Size. Despite size’s being the first factor in the traditional
Roberts analysis, courts have not identified a bright-line rule for the

107. Kevin J Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant Leap for Group Rights:
Accommodating the Associational Role of “Intimate” Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REV. 595,
598–99 (1993).
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id. at 609. By contrast, under the functional analysis proposed by this Note, both
prongs of the functional analysis would have to be met. Thus, neither of Professor Worthen’s
favored associations would likely qualify for protection.
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110

size of an intimate association. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has found that local Rotary Clubs, ranging from fewer than twenty to
111
more than nine hundred members, were not intimate. On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit has accepted the intimate association claims of
several New Orleans clubs with between six hundred and one
112
thousand members. And in her concurrence in New York State Club
113
Ass’n v. City of New York, Justice O’Connor suggested that in a city
as large as New York, a club with more than four hundred members
114
could be intimate. These seemingly inconsistent holdings suggest at
least two ways to analyze the size of a group seeking protection: by
comparing the group’s size to that of the community in which it is
115
located or by simply considering the absolute number of members
without comparison to the surrounding community.
With respect to a relative-size analysis, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in New York State Club Ass’n and the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Louisiana Debating provide indications of the relative
sizes that might be acceptable. First, if the population of New York
116
City is estimated to be approximately seven million, a fourhundred-member group would represent 0.006 percent of the total
population. At the other end of the range, taking the population of
117
New Orleans to be approximately five hundred thousand, a group
110. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s [Pi Lambda Phi] decision does not
give the court clear direction, particularly since the Supreme Court has not established a bright
line test when considering a group’s size.”), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
111. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987).
112. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir.
1995).
113. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
114. Id. at 19 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
115. See Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (“In determining whether a group is
intimate, the court should look at how small it is numerically in comparison to the potential pool
of applicants.”).
116. Population Finder: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.
census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo_id=16000US3651000&_
geoContext=01000US&_street=&_county=New+York&_cityTown=New+York&_state=04000
US36&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010
&_submenuId=population_0&ds_name=null&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull
&_keyword=&_industry= (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the population of New York
City in the 1990 census).
117. Population Finder: New Orleans City, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=Search&geo_id=16000US3651000&_geo
Context=01000US%7C04000US36%7C16000US3651000&_street=&_county=new+orleans&_
cityTown=new+orleans&_state=04000US22&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoS
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with one thousand members would represent 0.2 percent of the
population. Even if this analysis could provide a more consistent way
to analyze a group’s size, it would still raise the question of whether
one of two identical groups should be denied protection simply
because it is located in a smaller community.
Additionally, relative-size analysis does not make the factorbased analysis any more predictable because it has not been
uniformly accepted. In fact, in its first application of the Roberts
framework, the Supreme Court in Duarte based its size analysis on
the fact that local Rotary Clubs ranged from fewer than twenty to
118
more than nine hundred members without considering the size of
the cities in which the clubs were located. Similarly, the Second
Circuit in Chi Iota Colony rejected the district court’s relative-size
119
analysis and decided that the size of the group taken alone was the
120
relevant factor.
If, however, the relevant consideration is the absolute size of the
group, the analysis remains subject to uncertainty because there is no
clear determination of what size constitutes intimacy. This uncertainty
largely stems from the Duarte Court’s determination that Rotary
Clubs were not intimate because they ranged in size from fewer than
twenty to more than nine hundred members and from the fact that
the Court failed to clarify which number in that range was too large.
In Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit rejected the size of the
hypothetical four-hundred-member intimate group suggested by
Justice O’Connor and the nine-hundred-member upper range of the
Rotary Club, concluding instead that because some of the local
Rotary Clubs had had fewer than twenty members, the fraternity was
121
similar in size to other unprotected groups.
Finally, in addition to lacking clear standards, both forms of
analysis suffer from uncertainty as to how to measure the size of the

elect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=160&_submenuId=population_0&ds_name=null&_ci_nbr=
null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry= (last visited Dec. 19, 2011)
(providing the population of New Orleans in the 1990 census).
118. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
119. Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
120. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 145
(2d Cir. 2007) (“The Fraternity currently has nineteen members, eighteen of whom are CSI
students and one of whom is not. It aspires to one day have about fifty pledges per semester.
But the Fraternity places no limit on membership size.”).
121. Id. (“These characteristics render the Fraternity similar to other groups whose
intimate-association interests were held to be weak.” (citing Duarte, 481 U.S. at 546)).
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group. First, although scholars have generally concluded that the size
of local chapters, rather than the size of the national organization, is
122
the relevant consideration, courts nevertheless have considered
affiliation with a national organization as a factor that weighs against
123
an intimacy claim. Second, and perhaps most surprisingly, the
Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony determined that the relevant size
was not the nineteen members the fraternity had at the time of the
124
litigation but the fifty members it hoped to have one day.
2. Purpose. The purpose of a group is arguably the factor that is
most closely related to the underlying values of intimate association.
For that reason, a group that explicitly seeks both to cultivate shared
ideals and beliefs and to facilitate the creation of close bonds among
its members should have a strong argument under both factor-based
125
and functional analyses.
Additionally, under the intimate
association precedent summarized in the previous Part, to
differentiate themselves from nonintimate groups such as the Jaycees
and Rotary Clubs, groups seeking constitutional protection should
neither encourage civic involvement or community service nor aim to
provide business connections or networking benefits to their
members.

122. See Gregory F. Hauser, Intimate Associations Under the Law: The Rights of Social
Fraternities To Exist and To Be Free from Undue Interference by Host Institutions, 24 J.C. & U.L.
59, 77 (1997) (“Thus, the clear weight of the case law indicates that it is an individual chapter’s
size that must be assessed and that college social fraternity chapters are well within the
‘relatively small’ requirement.” (quoting La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans,
42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir. 1995)); Nancy S. Horton, Traditional Single-Sex Fraternities on
College Campuses: Will They Survive in the 1990s?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 419, 436 (1992) (“Courts may
reach an opposite conclusion, however, when the scope of the analysis is limited to the specific
local chapter at the particular collegiate campus and undergraduate chapters are distinguished
from alumni chapters.”); Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the
Public University Setting: How Broad Is the Right To Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 133, 149 (1997) (“The Supreme Court recognizes that it is the size of the local
chapter, not the entire national organization that weighs into the determination of intimacy.”
(citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984))).
123. See, e.g., La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497 (“The Clubs are managed and controlled locally
by their members; either directly, by an elected Board of Governors, or by both; none of the
Clubs is associated with or controlled by a national organization.”).
124. See supra note 120.
125. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Debating concluded that the clubs at issue
were sufficiently private to warrant constitutional protection based on the fact that the clubs
sought “to maintain an atmosphere in which their members [could] enjoy the comradery and
congeniality of one another.” La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497.
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Although these limitations are logical outgrowths of the privacybased foundations of the right, it is important to ask, as a normative
matter, whether it makes sense to require groups to refrain from
126
public participation to be constitutionally protected. This restriction
is particularly troublesome given the fact that the quintessential
intimate association—the family—is often the first setting in which
children learn the importance of social responsibility and civic
participation. As Part III explains, functional intimate association
analysis removes this strange disincentive to perform public service
by allowing groups to participate in public activities as long as those
activities do not negatively affect their abilities to perform the two
required functions of intimate association.
Setting aside this policy objection, the very requirement that a
court determine the purpose of a group introduces further
uncertainty into the factor-based analysis. Just as an expressive
127
group’s message is often subject to multiple interpretations, a
purportedly intimate group may have more than one purpose. For
this reason, the Court’s expressive association analysis in Boy Scouts
128
of America v. Dale is instructive. In that case, to determine whether
the acceptance of a homosexual scoutmaster would impermissibly
conflict with the Boy Scouts’ message on homosexuality, the Court
deferred to the Boy Scouts’ assertion that homosexual conduct was
129
inconsistent with the values they sought to instill in their members.
Despite the Supreme Court’s deference to an expressive group’s
characterization of its message, courts considering the purpose of
potential intimate associations often consider only their own
characterizations of the groups’ respective purposes. For example, in
Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit dismissed the fraternity’s
assertion that group members shared “a community of thoughts,
experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their lives” as
being too similar to the associations that could be advanced by any

126. Cf. Daggan, supra note 20, at 635–36 (“The sad irony is that the repercussions of this
decision will likely encourage even more discrimination by groups seeking to exercise intimate
association rights. . . . As a result of the Second Circuit’s ruling, in order for a group to be
accorded intimate association rights, it must be as discriminatory and secluded as possible.”).
127. See, e.g., Inazu, supra note 10, at 179–80 (listing three different characterizations of the
Boy Scouts’ purpose articulated by various members, ranging from camping to providing singlesex activities to creating opportunities for personal development).
128. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
129. Id. at 650 (“We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion. We need not inquire further to
determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.”).
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130

group in which members become friends. The court determined
instead that the group’s primary purpose was the promotion of
traditional fraternity values, community service, and the expression of
131
Jewish culture. In addition to conflicting with the group’s own
characterization of its purpose, this conclusion flew in the face of the
majority of intimate association scholarship, which, prior to Chi Iota
Colony, had generally concluded that fraternities had intimate
132
purposes.
Finally, even if a court defers to a group’s characterization of its
purpose, the analysis lacks a definite standard for determining which
purposes are intimate. For example, in rejecting the fraternity’s
statement that group members shared “a community of thoughts,
133
experiences, beliefs, and distinctly personal aspects of their lives,”
the Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony flatly contradicted the Supreme
Court’s Roberts opinion, which had used that phrase to describe the
134
defining purpose of intimate relationships.
Although simply
invoking the Roberts Court’s description of a family relationship is
not sufficient to earn constitutional protection, the Second Circuit’s
suggestion that such a description is meaningless indicates the wide
discretion that courts have in defining a group’s purpose.

130. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 146
(2d Cir. 2007).
131. Id.
132. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 77–78 (noting that the primary purpose of fraternities is
“to promote and encourage an interpersonal relationship and a life-long personal bond,” that
“[s]econdary purposes include personal social and emotional development and, like Boy Sco[u]t
troops, the instillation of values,” and that community-service participation is only a peripheral
purpose (footnote omitted) (quoting Timothy A. Fischer, Single Sex Status Protected,
FRATERNAL L. (Manley, Burke, Fischer & Lipton, Cincinnati, Ohio), Mar. 1994, at 3, 3));
Horton, supra note 122, at 439 (“The primary difference [between fraternities and service
organizations] is the fraternities’ emphasis on brother/sister-hood. Greek organizations exist
because students desire to seek friendships and form groups with others mirroring their values.
Unlike the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, fraternities focus on the individual and how that person
can become a better individual in society.”).
133. Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“According to its president, Fraternity brothers form
‘deep attachments and commitments’ and share ‘a community of thoughts, experiences, beliefs
and distinctly personal aspects of their lives.’ But the same can be said of nearly any student
group in which members become close friends.”).
134. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (“Family relationships, by their
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”).
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3. Selectivity. The extension of the right of intimate association
to social groups, what the Fifth Circuit has referred to as “private
association,” logically entails some requirement that membership not
135
be completely open to the general public. Because few decisions
have turned solely on a group’s selectivity, little guidance exists for a
group attempting ex ante to determine its level of intimacy. Thus, to
distinguish themselves from the Jaycees, who selected members based
136
solely on age and gender without any background inquiry, or the
Rotary Clubs, which were instructed to include all qualified
137
prospective members in their territories, groups seeking protection
must at a minimum carefully screen potential new members and
develop specific membership requirements. Careful screening might
be demonstrated by requiring all active members to vote on decisions
about whether to admit new members and by giving a limited number
138
of members the power to reject potential new members. In addition,
some courts have considered the extent to which a group recruits
139
aggressively from the general population.
In Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit based its decision largely
on two factors: the fraternity’s relatively high turnover rate and the
fact that the fraternity invited a large percentage of the Jewish men
140
who had expressed interest to join. This analysis demonstrates two
potential problems. First, although high turnover rates may indicate a
lack of intimate relationships, taken alone, they are not conclusive.
For example, whereas high turnover rates among new members might
indicate that their lengths of membership were short and that they
were therefore unlikely to have had time to develop close personal
bonds, departing members might be those who had been in the group
135. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 n.15 (5th Cir.
1995). In Louisiana Debating, the court used the term “private association” to refer to the
constitutional protections of private clubs, noting that the Supreme Court did not limit the right
of intimate association to familial situations. Id.
136. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
137. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987).
138. See, e.g., La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1496 (“Finally, whether to admit the prospective
member is voted on by the general membership. A very limited number of objections deny
membership . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Chapter actively recruits new members from the University population at
large and it is not particularly selective in whom it admits. The international organization of Pi
Lambda Phi strongly encourages its chapters to recruit new members aggressively so as to
continue the growth of the organization.”).
140. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136,
145–46 (2d Cir. 2007).
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the longest, increasing the probability that they had had ample time
to create close relationships. Thus, courts that replace selectivity in
the traditional sense—“the quality of carefully choosing
141
someone . . . as the best or most suitable” —with selectivity based on
turnover rates essentially consider an entirely different factor from
the one identified in Roberts, making it hard for groups seeking
protection to predict how they will be judged. The second problem
with the Second Circuit’s selectivity analysis is that the courts had
wide leeway in framing this analysis. The Second Circuit’s
consideration of the percentage of Jewish men expressing interest
who were invited to join rather than the percentage of the entire
student body or even the city of New York illustrates how even a
relatively small group might nevertheless be considered unselective.
4. Exclusion of Nonmembers. In addition to placing limits on
who can be a member, a private or intimate group must also make
142
sure that only members participate in the group’s central activities.
Exclusivity seems to be a logical companion toand extension
ofselectivity, but the determination of which events are central to a
group is inherently ambiguous. This problem is compounded by the
fact that courts, not members, make the final decision about which
activities are central to the members’ decisions to associate with one
143
another.
Most of the activities undertaken by typical groups can be
144
classified as one of four general types of activities : initiations or
rituals, regular business meetings, recruitment events, and general
public activities, such as community-service or social events. Of these,
initiation ceremonies and other rituals are often the group’s most
145
exclusive activities. Regular meetings are likely to be the next most

141. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 1613 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010).
142. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (“Moreover, much of the activity
central to the formation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of
strangers to that relationship.”).
143. See id. (“Indeed, numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly participate in a
substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one
another, including many of the organization’s various community programs, awards ceremonies,
and recruitment meetings.”).
144. Because no group is likely to be typical, these categories are intended only to be
illustrative and not comprehensive.
145. See Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Decisions about whether to offer or revoke
membership occur in private, as do the ceremonies in which prospective members become
pledges and pledges become full members.”); Horton, supra note 122, at 438 (“Only initiated
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146

exclusive, although groups vary widely on the extent to which
147
nonmembers are allowed to attend meetings. Recruitment events,
by necessity, involve nonmembers. Thus, to distinguish among groups
based on this category of activity, courts have considered factors such
148
as whether nonmembers must be invited to these events and
149
whether the events take place in public locations. Finally, public
activities, such as community-service events and parties, are intended
150
to include, and are often for the benefit of, nonmembers.
Because many groups participate in all four categories of
activities, a court’s decision regarding where to draw the line for
defining central activities is crucial. Although this determination will

fraternity members may attend meetings and other ritual ceremonies; nonmembers, outsiders,
and even pledges of the fraternity may not participate in or even observe fraternity ritual
ceremonies.”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“In addition, rituals are a critical aspect of
Greek organizations’ relations. Most fraternities and sororities require that their rituals be kept
secret, and require their members to swear under oath to keep them secret.”).
146. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Weekly business meetings and frequent
informal gatherings also take place only in the presence of members.”); Horton, supra note 122,
at 438 (“Fraternities conduct all their meetings in an atmosphere of privacy, secrecy, and
confidentiality . . . .”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“Most fraternities and sororities have
meetings open to members only. Not only are the general public and guests prevented from
joining in the meetings, but pledges are precluded from entering the meeting as well.” (footnote
omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987)
(“Members are encouraged to invite business associates and competitors to meetings. At some
Rotary Clubs, the visitors number in the tens and twenties each week. . . . The clubs are
encouraged to seek coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.” (quoting
Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at G-24, Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (No. 86-421)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (“[D]espite their inability to vote, hold
office, or receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various
meetings . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 n.15
(5th Cir. 1995) (“Only existing members may propose a new member.”).
149. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Many rush events are held in public places
such as local cafés or pool halls. During its February 2003 rush, the Fraternity planned several
events requiring the interaction of current and prospective members with non-members—a
party, as well as outings to a strip club, a karaoke bar, and a laser tag establishment.”).
150. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (“[N]umerous nonmembers of both genders regularly
participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to
associate with one another, including many of the organization’s various community
programs . . . .”); Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“The Fraternity gives parties, sometimes at a
profit, at which non-members—including women—are encouraged to attend.”); Pi Lambda Phi
Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The Chapter also
invites members of the public into its house for social activities and participates in many public
University events.”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“Not all aspects of Greek life are limited
only to members, however. Fraternities and sororities hold formal and semi-formal dances and
social parties to which members are permitted to bring a non-member guest.”).
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necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis, this Note proposes that
courts should consider the relative weight that members give each
type of activity rather than substituting their own perceptions of
which activities may be important to members. Moreover, as with
purpose analysis, courts should be careful not to ignore the fact that
even families, the quintessential intimate associations, often interact
with the public without compromising their intimate status.
5. Judicial Resort to Other Considerations. Notwithstanding its
general reliance on factor-based analysis in the context of clubs and
social groups, the Supreme Court has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been
willing to depart from the Roberts factors to deny intimate association
protection to less sympathetic plaintiffs in other contexts. In FW/PBS,
151
Inc. v. City of Dallas, the Court rejected the claim that patrons’
intimate association rights were violated by an ordinance classifying
hotels that rented rooms for fewer than ten hours as sexually oriented
152
businesses. Rather than applying the traditional Roberts factors, the
Court considered directly whether the patrons’ associations were of
the type that the right of intimate association was intended to
153
protect. The Court ruled that “[a]ny ‘personal bonds’ that are
formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten hours are not
those that have ‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and
154
beliefs.’”
This departure from the Roberts factors has two implications for
this Note. First, by suggesting that the Roberts factors can be ignored
when considering intimate association claims, the Court created even
greater uncertainty about how any given claim will be analyzed.
Second, by explicitly considering what this Note refers to as the first
function of intimate association, the Supreme Court’s decision in
FW/PBS demonstrated the potential for courts to apply the functional
analysis proposed in Part III.
B. Failure To Accurately Identify Intimate Groups
In addition to the problems of inconsistency and unpredictability
described in the previous Section, factor-based analysis is simply a
151.
152.
153.
154.

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19).
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poor proxy for determining which groups actually promote the values
that form the basis of the right of intimate association. Because courts
traditionally consider only the Roberts factors—size, purpose,
selectivity, exclusion of nonmembers, and other factors—in
155
determining a group’s level of intimacy, a group may be able to
manipulate its constitutional status by altering those specific
attributes without altering the role it plays in the life of its members.
Imagine, for example, a social club with fifty members. The club
charges members a yearly fee for the use of its facilities. It has no
limit on size, solicits new members from the general public, and
imposes no requirements for membership other than that all
members must be male. Male guests are allowed under very limited
circumstances, and no female guests are ever admitted. Members do
not generally know one another and share only casual interactions
when they happen to be at the club at the same time. There are no
weekly meetings. Finally, assume that the state in which the club is
located has passed a law, similar to the Minnesota Human Rights Act
at issue in Roberts, that prohibits gender discrimination in places of
156
public accommodation.
In response to a suit challenging its
discriminatory membership policy, the club claims that it is an
intimate association. Even under a generous application of the factorbased analysis, this group is unlikely to qualify for protection. Its size,
lack of selectivity, and general commercial purpose are almost certain
to outweigh its credible argument about exclusivity.
Now, assume that prior to the challenge, the group attempts to
strengthen its intimacy claim by altering its relevant attributes to
comply with intimate association precedent. It begins by officially
limiting its size to fifty members. The club also requires that new
members be invited by current members and earn the votes of 75
percent of the current members. Information about the interests and
backgrounds of potential new members is distributed to inform the
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. The pertinent part of the Act in Roberts provided: “It is an unfair discriminatory
practice . . . [t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of
race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.” MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982);
see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615 (examining claims under the Act). The Act defined “[p]lace of
public accommodation” as a “business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation,
or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made
available to the public.” MINN. STAT. § 363.01(18) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615 (examining the Act’s definition).
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current members before they vote on new members. Finally, the
group specifies that its purpose is to maintain an atmosphere in which
its members can enjoy the camaraderie and congeniality of one
another.
Is the club more intimate under this second scenario than it was
under the first? Although this question cannot be answered with legal
157
certainty until after litigation, these changes bring the group closer
to, if not within, the zone of constitutional protection created by
intimate association precedent. The fifty-member limit, for example,
is at least on the low end of the Duarte spectrum from twenty to nine
hundred, and it is far smaller than the memberships of the clubs
protected in Louisiana Debating. Additionally, the new membership
requirements improve the group’s selectivity, making it more similar
to the clubs protected in Louisiana Debating than the Jaycees or the
Rotary Club. The new purposetaken directly from Louisiana
158
Debating will also likely strengthen the group’s purpose argument.
Even with these changes, however, it is worthwhile to consider
whether the group is any more like a family than the fraternity in Chi
Iota Colony—or even than the Rotary Club—and whether it is any
more deserving of constitutional protection. This central question is
lost through an overreliance on factor-based analysis.
*

*

*

These illustrations highlight a central and inevitable problem in
applying the Roberts factors without considering the underlying
values of intimate association. Because the Roberts factors are merely
tools to help identify the kinds of relationships deserving of
constitutional protection, they are meaningless when disconnected
from those underlying values. As a result, courts have almost
unlimited discretion not only in framing each of the factors but also in
determining how those factors will be compared with the
characteristics of other protected or unprotected groups. Responding
to this unpredictable and inconsistent application of traditional
factor-based analysis, Part III argues that courts should abandon their
sole reliance on the Roberts factors and adopt a functional intimate

157. See supra Part II.A.
158. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir.
1995) (“[T]hey seek to maintain an atmosphere in which their members can enjoy the
comradery and congeniality of one another.”).
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association analysis under which a group’s intimacy is determined by
its role in the life of its members.
III. FUNCTIONAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS
A. Doctrinal Foundations and Benefits of Functional Analysis
Rather than giving conclusive weight to a group’s physical
characteristics, courts applying functional analysis should consider
explicitly whether a group is likely to provide the benefitsboth to its
members and to society as a wholethat justify the constitutional
right of intimate association. In Roberts, the Court provided a
framework for identifying groups that deserve protection by
associating the central benefits of intimate associations with the
159
specific functions that make them possible. According to the
Roberts Court, a group that cultivates and transmits shared ideals and
beliefs—the first characteristic function of intimate associations—
provides the societal benefits of increased diversity and separation
160
between the individual and the power of the state. Similarly, a
group that facilitates the creation of close ties with others—the
second characteristic function of intimate associations—provides an
opportunity for emotional enrichment that allows the group’s
161
members to define their own identities.
Building on these two considerations, this Note argues that a
court seeking to make the difficult and somewhat nebulous
determination of whether a group “reflect[s] the considerations that
have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic
162
element of personal liberty” should consider whether the group

159. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19 (“Without precisely identifying every consideration
that may underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of
personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State. Moreover, the constitutional
shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from
unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.” (citations omitted)); Worthen, supra note 107,
at 605–06 (noting that the Roberts Court “identified two distinct constitutionally protected roles
for intimate associations,” one that focuses on benefits to society and one that focuses on
individual liberty).
160. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 620.
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actually serves the functions identified rather than simply examining
the group’s measurable characteristics. Under functional analysis in
its simplest form, a group that sufficiently (1) cultivates and transmits
shared ideals and beliefs and (2) facilitates the creation of close
relationships among members would be entitled to constitutional
protection.
Although a wide range of relationships might serve these
functions in some way, the Court’s recognition of familial
relationships as the exemplary intimate associations heightens the
standard for considering these functions and provides a necessary
163
limitation on the groups that are entitled to protection. Only groups
that serve these characteristic functions in a way that is similar to a
family relationship deserve protection as intimate associations.
Functional analysis, therefore, provides a more relevant and more
accurate way to achieve the ultimate goal of traditional factor-based
analysis: a meaningful comparison between the group seeking
protection and a family relationship.
Functional analysis also improves upon factor-based analysis by
removing a level of abstraction from a court’s decision. In other
words, the Court did not recognize the right of intimate association so
that small, selective, and exclusive groups could exist. Instead, these
factors serve as proxies for the likelihood that a group provides the
benefits typically associated with intimate associations. Without
making the connection between the factors and the defining
characteristics of intimate associations explicit, however, courts can
too easily lose sight of the real considerations that underlie
constitutional protection and can confuse the factors with the
rationale itself. Because the functions are directly responsible for the
underlying benefits, a group’s intimacy can be properly determined
based on whether the group cultivates and transmits shared beliefs
and facilitates the creation of close bonds among members. Thus,
functional analysis removes the danger of ignoring the underlying
values of intimate association and clearly identifies the strong
interests at stake when a group seeks protection from state
interference.

163. See id. (“The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this
sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation of sustenance of a
family . . . .”).
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As Part III.B illustrates, it is in supporting functional analysis
that the Roberts factors regain their meaning. Functional analysis
therefore serves as a framework that allows courts to consider the
traditional Roberts factors along with any other factors that are
relevant to the group’s ability to serve the characteristic functions.
Thus, although the size or selectivity of a group alone would not
justify constitutional protection, both of those factors may be relevant
in determining whether the group facilitates the creation of close
relationships. In this way, functional analysis salvages the Roberts
framework while ensuring that truly intimate groups receive
constitutional protection.
B. Application of Functional Intimate Association Analysis
Because the Supreme Court has identified two characteristic
functions of intimate associations, functional analysis ultimately
breaks down into two distinct questions: (1) Does the group cultivate
and transmit shared ideals and beliefs, and (2) does the group
facilitate the creation of close bonds between members? For each of
these questions, a court must determine first whether the group
serves the requisite function and second how closely the group
resembles a family relationship. Only a group whose functions are
significantly similar to a family relationship’s functions will qualify for
constitutional protection. This Section identifies some of the
considerations that might be relevant in analyzing the two functions
of intimate associations.
A number of considerations might be relevant to a court’s
determination that a group cultivates and transmits shared ideals and
beliefs. Of the traditional Roberts factors, the purpose of the group, as
stated in its governing documents or as viewed by its members, would
serve as a useful starting point. A group whose primary purpose is to
host social events or to participate in community service is unlikely to
serve this first function, whereas a group whose stated purpose is to
assist and direct its members’ personal development is more likely to
transmit certain beliefs. Outside of the traditional Roberts factors,
additional considerations may include whether the group has a clearly
established moral code or code of conduct and whether the group
conducts rituals and ceremonies for members. A group that espouses
a moral code is more likely to transmit its beliefs to members in a
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164

significant way. In the same fashion, a group that uses initiation
rituals and other ceremonies will often have an opportunity to present
its ideals and beliefs clearly and directly to its members. At the same
time, groups with temporary or sporadic membership will often lack
this opportunity. Thus, insofar as an established and consistent
membership would better allow the group to transmit its beliefs, the
traditional factors of selectivity and exclusion of nonmembers may be
relevant.
After determining that a group cultivates and transmits shared
ideals and beliefs, the court must decide whether it does so in a way
that is sufficiently similar to a family relationship. Because families
are often the primary source of many personal ideals and beliefs,
groups seeking protection face a relatively high standard. In FW/PBS,
the Court specifically considered the extent to which a relationship
cultivated and transmitted shared ideals and beliefs, finding that the
patrons of a hotel room rented for fewer than ten hours would not
form the types of relationships that are entitled to constitutional
protection as a result of the critical role those relationships have
165
played “in the culture and traditions of the Nation.” This ruling
suggests that the duration of the relationship could be considered as
one indication of the strength of the associational interests.
Additionally, in a case involving a student group like the
fraternity in Chi Iota Colony, a court may consider the extent to
which the group serves as a surrogate family for its members. Under
this analysis, student groups will often serve the function of
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs to a greater
extent than groups that are composed mostly of older adults. Based
on this consideration, many college Greek-letter organizations should
satisfy the first requirement for protection as intimate associations.
On the other hand, social groups, such as the clubs at issue in
Louisiana Debating or the hypothetical club considered in Part II.B,
whose purposes are simply to provide a congenial atmosphere for
their members, are less likely to cultivate and transmit shared ideals
and beliefs.
Notably, this first branch of a functional analysis demonstrates
the potential for a group to be both an intimate and an expressive
164. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he values
the Boy Scouts seeks to instill” are grounded in the “Scout Oath and Law.”).
165. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at
618–19).
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association. In considering the nature of a group’s expression to its
members, functional analysis rejects the obsession with secrecy and
privacy that has contributed to a strict prohibition on communications
between intimate associations and the outside world under factorbased analysis. In contrast to the court’s reasoning in Louisiana
Debating, which considered the fact that the clubs did not even
publicly disclose their locations as a factor weighing in the clubs’
166
favor, functional analysis respects the Roberts Court’s statement
that “[t]he intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally
167
protected association may, of course, coincide.” If intimate and
expressive association can coincide in a single group, a group’s
expressive activity should not disqualify it from intimate status. In
particular, the fact that a group advertises its recruitment efforts or
participates in philanthropic activities should be considered only if
those actions prevent the group from serving the functions that are
characteristic of intimate associations.
In considering the second requirement—that the group facilitate
the creation of close bonds among its members—all of the traditional
Roberts factors may become relevant, though not for their own sake.
Although members of a relatively small group might be generally
more likely to form close bonds, functional analysis gives courts
discretion to consider groups on a case-by-case basis. A group whose
members live together or meet frequently, for example, might be able
to facilitate close bonds among a larger number of members than a
group that meets less frequently. Careful selection of members based
on compatibility and exclusion of nonmembers would also tend to
weigh in favor of a group seeking protection because these
characteristics are likely to improve members’ abilities to form close
relationships.
Considering the factors within the framework of functional
analysis allows courts to review the relevance of any given
characteristic in each case. Thus, commonly considered factors such
as high turnover rates or national affiliation may not be conclusive or
even helpful in many cases. For instance, although the high turnover
rates and potentially large size of a public-minded group that meets
infrequently, such as the Rotary Club, might serve as evidence that its
members do not form close bonds, it is easy to imagine a situation in
166. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1496 (5th Cir.
1995).
167. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
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which even relatively high annual turnover rates would not prevent
close relationships from forming. For example, in the case of a group
whose members participate in frequent meetings and group activities,
the potential for the formation of significant and emotionally
enriching relationships among members may be only marginally
affected by the fact that a quarter of its members will graduate or
leave the group each year.
After a court has concluded that a group facilitates the creation
of close bonds between its members, it must then determine whether
the group serves that function in a way that is sufficiently similar to
the role performed by a family relationship. Although the Court has
never specified specify the level of similarity required, the strength of
the bonds must situate the group close to family relationships on the
spectrum between the most intimate and the most attenuated of
personal attachments. In contrast to the measures of seclusion and
168
isolation that have dominated factor-based analysis, the evaluation
proposed by functional analysis of the strength of the bonds formed
among group members is more consistent with the recognition of the
family as the quintessential intimate association. After all, although
families often interact with nonmembers and participate in activities
outside of the household, they are largely defined by the strength of
their relationships.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court provided some guidance for
comparing the strength of the bonds between members of a social
group and those of a family, explaining that “[f]amily relationships, by
their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
169
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” The bonds among
members of truly intimate associations are therefore unique because
individuals can only form a small number of these kinds of
relationships over a lifetime. Other factors that might be relevant

168. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d
136, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The associational interests of the Fraternity differ from the interests
asserted by the social groups that were plaintiffs in [Louisiana Debating], on which the district
court relied. In that case, . . . . [e]ach club had its own unmarked, private facility, which nonmembers were strictly prohibited from using.”); La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1496 (“Each club has
only one facility, which is maintained for the exclusive use of its members and guests. No signs
outside the Clubs’ buildings identify the locations to the public. Nonmembers are strictly
prohibited from using the facilities.” (footnote omitted)).
169. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20.
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include the duration of the relationships and the extent to which
members participate in each other’s personal lives outside of official
group events.
Based on these considerations, certain nonfamily social groups,
such as fraternities and sororities, should qualify for constitutional
protection. In many cases the bonds formed within these groups
survive well beyond the period of active membership in the
organization. Additionally, fraternity and sorority members often
share in the distinctly personal aspects of fellow members’ lives,
including not only major life events such as weddings and funerals but
also day-to-day activities that are not planned by or related to the
group. This potential for intimacy can be easily contrasted with the
hypothetical social club considered in Part II.B, whose members
shared only casual connections as a result of their concurrent use of
the group’s facilities.
Functional intimate association analysis, then, rejects the
reflexive resort to the Roberts factors that has given rise to the
traditional factor-based analysis. Instead of giving conclusive weight
to four characteristics that serve as imprecise proxies for a group’s
ability to provide the benefits associated with intimate associations,
functional analysis requires courts to consider explicitly a group’s role
in the life of its members and in the community—an analysis that may
take into account the Roberts factors and any other characteristics
that bear on the group’s ability to serve these two core functions.
C. Objections to Functional Intimate Association Analysis
Notwithstanding the greater reliability and accuracy provided by
functional analysis, this proposal is likely to provoke criticism on the
ground that it too greatly increases judicial discretion, too broadly
extends constitutional protection, or represents too large a departure
from Supreme Court precedent. As this Section illustrates, however,
none of these objections is justified, and none should prevent courts
from implementing functional analysis.
First, critics might argue that because a group’s functions are
potentially more difficult to measure than the group’s physical
characteristics, a court would have too much flexibility in determining
both whether a group serves the functions that are characteristic of
intimate associations and whether, in serving those functions, the
group is sufficiently like a family relationship. Although unrestrained
judicial discretion has long been a concern for courts applying
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substantive due process to protect fundamental rights, America’s
judicial system relies on the ability of judges to make reasoned
171
judgments reflecting a balance between competing societal values.
Additionally, as Chi Iota Colony demonstrates, even seemingly
objective factors such as size are often subject to surprising
interpretations that reflect a court’s perception of the group’s
172
intimacy.
In fact, functional analysis would actually improve upon factorbased analysis by increasing judicial accountability. Although courts
would still have considerable flexibility to determine which groups
are intimate, the basis for those decisions under functional analysis
would need to be made more explicit. For example, when faced with a
claim for protection by a nonintimate group, a court applying factorbased analysis might simply point out the group’s large desired size
173
and high turnover rates. Applying functional analysis, however, a
court would have to use those and any other relevant factors to
support its explicit conclusion that the group had failed to fulfill a
characteristic function of intimate associations. Additionally, the
group might be able to respond by making changes that would allow
it to serve the required functions rather than attempting merely to
manipulate its constitutional status by altering its physical
characteristics.
A second potential objection is that the adoption of functional
analysis would provide constitutional protection to a greater number
of discriminatory groups, subverting the state interest in equality.
Although functional analysis may limit the state’s power to prevent
private groups from discriminating, both individual liberty and
174
equality are valued in the American constitutional scheme. By

170. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended.”).
171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The
inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court
in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always
have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple
rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree;
yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our office.”).
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. See supra Part III.B.
174. Cf. John D. Inazu, Op-Ed., Siding with Sameness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July
1, 2010, at 9A (“The court should have decided [Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
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allowing courts to ignore the benefits that underlie recognition of the
right of intimate association, factor-based analysis has weakened the
protections for individual liberty. As a result, functional analysis is
necessary because it ensures that courts will clearly identify the
benefits provided by intimate association before engaging in the
difficult balancing of liberty and equality.
Finally, critics might question whether lower courts would have
the authority to implement functional analysis before the question
had reached the Supreme Court and whether approval of functional
analysis would violate stare decisis. These concerns, however, are
misplaced. First, the analysis proposed by this Note is not only
consistent with but is also derived from the Supreme Court’s holdings
in Roberts and Duarte, and its implementation would not require
either of those decisions to be overruled. Functional analysis is
intended only to improve the courts’ ability to protect the
associational rights identified by the Supreme Court. Thus, lower
courts should not be precluded from strengthening their reasoning by
clearly explaining how the factors that they consider are related to the
underlying values of intimate association. Second, to the extent that
the implementation of functional analysis by the Supreme Court
would require it to overrule factor-based decisions by lower courts,
the Court would merely be clarifying the boundaries of the right of
intimate association and adjusting the method of analysis rather than
altering the right itself. Thus, neither lower federal courts nor the
Supreme Court should be concerned about structural or prudential
barriers to applying functional analysis.
CONCLUSION
More than twenty years before the right of intimate association
was recognized in Roberts, Justice Harlan warned against a formulaic
approach to due process, saying, “Due process has not been reduced
to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any
code. The best that can be said is that . . . it has represented the
balance which our Nation . . . has struck between that liberty and the
175
demands of organized society.” Respecting this admonition, courts
have ordinarily rejected the allure of simple rules and have
2971 (2010)] by choosing between two constitutional visions: a radical sameness that destroys
dissenting traditions (religious, sexual or otherwise), or the destabilizing difference of a
meaningful pluralism.”).
175. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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acknowledged their duty to protect fundamental rights through the
exercise of reasoned judgment. In the context of the right of intimate
association, however, a group’s level of constitutional protection
often depends entirely on a court’s analysis of a handful of the
group’s objective characteristics divorced from the values that
originally led to the recognition of the right itself. This line of factorbased decisions, which mistakenly treat the factors as the sole
rationale for constitutional protection, obscures the true benefits of
intimate associations both to group members and to the nation as a
whole. In doing so, these decisions undermine the ability of the right
of intimate association to protect individual liberties by providing a
balance against other state interests.
To save the right of intimate association, courts should abandon
their sole reliance on the Roberts factors and adopt a functional
analysis that clearly identifies the right’s underlying values and
ensures that groups reflecting those considerations are consistently
protected. By requiring courts to consider whether a group serves the
functions that are characteristic of intimate associations—cultivating
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs and facilitating the creation
of close bonds between members—functional analysis provides a
framework for considering all of the factors that may be relevant to
the court’s determination. Functional analysis, then, restores
reasoned judgment to a court’s consideration of intimate association
claims by nonfamily groups and eliminates the formulaic approach
that has threatened to undermine the court’s role as a protector of
individual liberty.

